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12. Autonomy and machine learning at the 
interface of nuclear weapons, computers and 
people 
SHAHAR AVIN AND S.M. AMADAE1 
A new era for our species started in 1945: with the terrifying demonstration of 
the power of the atom bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the potential 
global catastrophic consequences of human technology could no longer be 
ignored. Within the field of global catastrophic and existential risk, nuclear 
war is one of the more iconic scenarios, although significant uncertainties 
remain about its likelihood and potential destructive magnitude.2 The risk 
posed to humanity from nuclear weapons is not static. In tandem with 
geopolitical and cultural changes, technological innovations could have a 
significant impact on how the risk of the use of nuclear weapons changes over 
time. 
Increasing attention has been given in the literature to the impact of digital 
technologies, and in particular autonomy and machine learning, on nuclear 
risk. Most of this attention has focused on ‘first-order’ effects: the introduction 
of technologies into nuclear command-and-control and weapon-delivery 
systems.3 This essay focuses instead on higher-order effects: those that stem 
from the introduction of such technologies into more peripheral systems, with 
a more indirect (but no less real) effect on nuclear risk. It first describes and 
categorizes the new threats introduced by these technologies (in section I). It 
then considers policy responses to address these new threats (section II). 
I. New technology brings new threats 
The risks of these higher-order effects can be divided into two categories. 
 
1. In the first category are new vulnerabilities in the trusted computing base 
(TCB) of nuclear deterrence due to the introduction of machine learning into 
 
1 The authors would like to thank the participants in the Plutonium, Silicon and Carbon Workshop 
held by the University of Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk in Sep. 2018, for a lively 
discussion of these topics. They are also grateful to Jon Lindsay for sharing unpublished materials and 
insights, and to Vincent Boulanin, Baruch Malewich and Liran Renert for helpful comments. 
2 For an estimate see e.g. Barrett, A. M., Baum, S. D. and Hostetler, K., ‘Analyzing and reducing the 
risks of inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia’, Science & Global Security, vol. 
21, no. 2 (2013), pp. 106–33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2013.798984>, p. 120.  
3 Thompson, N., ‘Inside the apocalyptic Soviet doomsday machine’, Wired, 21 Sep. 2009, 
<https://www.wired.com/2009/09/mf-deadhand>; and ‘“Doomsday machine”: Russia’s new weapon 
reportedly gets nuclear warhead’, Sputnik, 17 May 2018, 
<https://sputniknews.com/russia/201805171064549993-russiaposeidon-system-torpedo/>. See also the 
other chapters, in particular 4–10 and 13, in this volume.  
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nuclear command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (NC4ISR) systems. The TCB of a computer 
system is ‘The totality of protection mechanisms within [that] system . . . 
responsible for enforcing a security policy’.4 Nuclear deterrence presumably 
requires a security policy that always allows authorized personnel to (a) detect 
threats that call for a nuclear response and (b) launch a nuclear response, while 
(c) never allowing unauthorized personnel to launch nuclear weapons. As 
such, at a minimum, the TCB of nuclear deterrence would include all critical 
NC4ISR systems (i.e. those systems where a malfunction or compromise 
would undermine a, b and c). 
2. The second category of risks consists of novel and amplified threats from 
the use of autonomy and machine learning in the planning and execution of 
cyber operations and influence campaigns against nuclear weapon systems and 
associated personnel. 
 
Both of these categories expand and amplify existing threats, rather than 
introduce entirely new categories of threat. Nonetheless, the scale of the effect 
is substantial and may render feasible certain attacks that were previously 
infeasible. 
Machine learning and autonomy in NC4ISR introduces new attack 
surfaces 
Computer systems are susceptible to attack. They rely on many lines of code 
that contain numerous opportunities for developers to make a mistake or fail 
to consider all possible implications, in a way that introduces a vulnerability—
a bug. A patient and resourceful adversary is often able to reliably find and 
exploit such vulnerabilities in order to gain control of or disrupt the operations 
of a computer or computer-based system.  
Responses to this computer security threat have evolved over the decades, 
from pre-deployment testing to formal guarantees that certain parts of code do 
not contain specific kinds of vulnerability.5 Another powerful practice is to 
limit the ‘attack surface’ of a system—that is, all the points at which an 
attacker can interact with the systems. For instance, this can be done by 
restricting functionality, introducing authority restrictions or restricting input 
channels, or through practices such as air-gapping, which physically separates 
the system from any network.6 However, some of these security practices limit 
autonomy, which requires a high-level of functionality and integration with 
numerous inputs (including networked resources). Thus, wherever there is a 
 
4 US Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Defense Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation 
Criteria, DOD Standard 5200.28-STD (DOD: Washington, DC, 26 Dec. 1985), 
<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a207905.pdf>, p. 116. 
5 Anderson, R., Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Second 
Edition, (Wiley Publishing, Inc.: Indianapolis, IN, 2008), chapter 26. 
6 Saltzer, J. H. and Schroeder, M. D., ‘The protection of information in computer systems’, 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 63, no. 9 (Sep. 1975), pp. 1278–1308, 
<https://doi.org/10.1109/PROC.1975.9939>. 
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push towards autonomy that allows for complex behaviour (e.g. human-like or 
even animal-like perception or behaviour), these security practices may not be 
viable. 
The challenge of maintaining computer security against digital attacks is 
even harder for machine learning than for autonomy. While autonomous 
complex behaviour could be produced through a set of rules laid out and 
scrutinized by a developer, a machine learning approach to a problem instead 
seeks to bring about correct behaviour through analysis of large amounts of 
data. While the learning algorithm is specified, scrutinized and tested by the 
developer, the learned behaviours in many contemporary approaches cannot 
be scrutinized to the same degree as rule-based systems.7  
It is already known that a broad range of models trained through machine 
learning are susceptible to a new kind of vulnerability, termed ‘adversarial 
examples’: an adversary can craft a malicious input that reliably causes a 
trained model to produce the wrong behaviour (e.g. misclassify an object in an 
image or take an inappropriate action in the environment).8 While this 
vulnerability has been known and researched heavily for several years, no 
robust solution has yet been found. Nonetheless, given the promise of new 
capabilities that machine learning and automation offer, the pressure to deploy 
potentially insecure systems may present itself.9 
When considering threats that might be introduced from increased 
autonomy and use of machine learning, it is important to consider the entire 
sprawling range of systems and functions that make up and support NC4ISR. 
Specific attention has been given to delivery systems and to nuclear command, 
control and communications (NC3).10 The awareness of potential threats to 
‘core’ computer systems in NC3 has led to significantly improved security for 
such systems, and some reluctance to introduce autonomy and machine 
learning into them.11 However, more peripheral systems can also pose a threat, 
especially as they are more likely sites for the introduction of autonomy and 
machine learning. These include, for example, systems onboard satellites that 
relay communications and images or the simulators used to plan and test 
strategies. They can also extend as far as the vast computer systems and 
 
7 Barreno, M. et al., ‘The security of machine learning. Machine Learning, vol. 81, no. 2 (Nov. 2010), 
121–48, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10994-010-5188-5>. 
8 Szegedy, C. et al., ‘Intriguing properties of neural networks’, arXiv, 1312.6199, version 4, 19 Feb. 
2014, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.6199v4.pdf>. 
9 Geist, E. and Lohn, A. J., How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War? (Rand 
Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2018), 
<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE296/RAND_PE296.pdf>, p. 10. 
10 On delivery systems see US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Weapon Systems 
Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities, GAO-19-128 (GAO: 
Washington, DC, 9 Oct. 2018), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf>. On NC3 see Anderson, 
R., Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Second Edition, (Wiley 
Publishing, Inc.: Indianapolis, IN, 2008), chapter 13. On these issues see also chapters 5–10 and 13 of 
this volume.  
11 On the vulnerability of machine learning to cyberattack as an obstacle to the adoption of machine 
learning in the military sphere see also chapters 3 and 6 of this volume. 
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networks that provide news information to the public and to civilian officials, 
which may affect tactical or strategic decision-making.  
Admittedly, it is not always easy to chart a scenario that begins with a 
compromise of a particular peripheral system and ends with the unauthorized 
launch of a nuclear weapon.12 It is similarly difficult to describe a scenario 
whereby an adversary would intervene in the authorized launch of a nuclear 
weapon. However, these systems are present for the well-funded and patient 
adversary to explore and exploit. In particular, there is increasing concern 
about attacks that initially target command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems that 
are ‘entangled’—that is, used for both nuclear and conventional weapons—
such as satellites, intelligence gathering and logistics.13 Entangled systems 
present two challenges here: first, they are often not considered ‘nuclear’ 
systems, so are subject to a lower level of security scrutiny than nuclear 
systems. Second, attacks on such systems may be considered by an adversary 
as unlikely to trigger a nuclear escalation, leading to a miscalculation—the 
adversary may not even know that the system has an NC4ISR purpose, and 
therefore consider the attack to be conventional, while the targeted state may 
perceive the attack as an attack on its nuclear capabilities. 
Machine learning and autonomy can be used to carry out cyber and 
influence operations against nuclear systems and personnel 
Having surveyed ways in which a state may heighten vulnerability and risk by 
introducing autonomy and machine learning into its own NC4ISR systems, the 
various ways in which an attacker could deploy machine learning and 
autonomy to compromise an adversary’s NC4ISR systems—even those that 
do not feature any autonomy or machine learning—are now considered. 
The attack surface of the NC4ISR systems of a nuclear-armed state is 
composed of numerous computer systems (as surveyed above) and also a 
broad range of personnel. These include the military personnel in charge of 
deploying weapons; the civilian contractors tasked with building and 
maintaining weapon systems; and the civilian authorities that take decisions to 
fund maintenance, modernization or retirement of weapon systems. There are 
also the individuals, groups and international bodies that advocate arms 
control measures and seek to sway public opinion and nuclear norms, and 
many others on the long list of involved persons. 
No computer system should be considered perfectly secure. Rather, security 
mechanisms are placed to increase the cost or the risk to the attacker to a level 
that makes an attack effectively impractical under most expected conditions. 
For example, requiring the simultaneous action of two individuals to arm a 
 
12 For an in-depth exploration of this see Futter, A., Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear 
Weapons (Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC, 2018). 
13 Acton, J. M., ‘Escalation through entanglement: how the vulnerability of command-and-control 
systems raises the risks of an inadvertent nuclear war’, International Security, vol. 43, no. 1 (summer 
2018), pp. 56–99, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320>. 
EURO-ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES   5 
nuclear weapon requires an attacker to compromise two insiders instead of 
one. Air gapping a system requires an attacker to gain physical access to the 
system. Within narrow domains, cryptography and computer security can 
ensure that the computational power required to attack a system is 
astronomical. However, when considering the entire attack surface of 
NC4ISR, it is not currently possible to provide such guarantees for the system 
as a whole. In theory, applications of machine learning and autonomy on the 
attacker’s side can reduce the cost of an attack and transform the target system 
system from being ‘effectively secure’ to being ‘effectively insecure’. 
Articulating the specific ways in which autonomy and machine learning 
could reduce the cost of an attack requires access to information that is partly 
or entirely classified. Instead, the kinds of novel attack that nuclear-armed 
states should consider in their threat assessments are illustrated by the 
following two qualitative descriptions of scenarios that feature autonomy and 
machine learning in numerous places within an attacker’s system.14 
Use of machine learning and autonomy to compromise NC4ISR computer 
systems at scale 
In this scenario, country A is interested in developing a reliable capability to 
monitor, degrade or disrupt numerous key digital components of country B’s 
NC4ISR systems. First, country A finds information about potential targets in 
country B’s systems, for example, what hardware and software are installed, 
the network setup and access, and so on. This is traditional intelligence work: 
gathering information from sources in procurement, defence contractors and in 
military bases.15 Country A may deploy machine learning to process large 
volumes of mostly irrelevant data from commercial, trade, procurement, 
budgetary or logistics sources that may shed light on which systems are 
installed and where. If country A is well positioned to do so, it may aim to 
become the upstream supplier of components for its adversaries’ military 
systems.16  
Once a list of target technologies is compiled, country A can gain access to 
country B’s systems via a copy of either compiled or source code or through a 
remote connection or a replica. With access to source code, country A can 
search for vulnerabilities in the target systems and create exploits.17 Machine 
learning techniques and automation expedite the search for patterns of 
common mistakes that could lead to an exploit. Access to compiled code, 
 
14 On the potential use of machine learning in attacks see Brundage, M. et al., The Malicious Use of 
Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention and Mitigation (Future of Humanity Institute et al.: 
Oxford, Feb. 2018), <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07228v1.pdf>. 
15 Sanger, D. E., The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (Crown: New 
York, 2018). 
16 E.g. Robertson, J. and Riley, M., ‘The big hack: how China used a tiny chip to infiltrate U.S. 
companies’, Bloomberg Businessweek, 4 Oct. 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-
10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies>. 
17 Jon B. and Rich T., ‘A day in the life of an NCSC vulnerability researcher’, British National Cyber 
Security Centre, 17 Nov. 2017, <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/day-life-ncsc-vulnerability-
researcher>. 
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when combined with reverse engineering, allows a similar machine learning- 
and automation-expedited search for vulnerabilities. Finally, with only ‘black 
box’ access to a system (where inputs can be sent to the system and outputs 
can be read out, but no access to source or compiled code is possible), security 
researchers can try a large number of input combinations to find 
vulnerabilities. This method, called ‘fuzzing’, is often heavily automated.18  
Once country A has identified a range of vulnerabilities in country B’s 
systems, it needs to devise a plan for how to use them. To make detection 
harder and increase deniability, country A might take control of a third party’s 
insecure computational resources to set up autonomous or semi-autonomous 
bots armed with the code needed to launch the exploits against country B’s 
systems. The systems that control the network of bots may themselves include 
significant automation, to allow many computers to operate in synchronization 
and to further complicate detection and attribution. Machine learning tools 
could be used to analyse the statistical profile of traffic in the target network 
or intermediary networks, so that bot-generated traffic could mimic the same 
distribution and avoid detection by statistics-based defence tools.  
In these examples, autonomy and machine learning do not present country A 
with an entirely novel capability, but instead increase the scale of existing 
capabilities or reduce the costs of staff and training. In addition, autonomy and 
machine learning increase distance and reduce the likelihood of discovery and 
attribution. In doing so, they may lower the perceived costs (in money or fear 
of retaliation) of an attack.  
Use of machine learning and autonomy to launch a nuclear-capability-
retarding manipulation campaign 
In this scenario, country A seeks to influence opinions and decision-making in 
country B. This might be by decreasing the funds and talent available for 
country B’s nuclear operations or by decreasing the likelihood that country B 
will respond to an ambiguous or threatening situation with a nuclear attack. 
First, country A identifies the decision makers it would like to influence. 
These could be elected officials who vote on budgets, senior military 
personnel who decide on future plans and protocols for escalation, or potential 
recruits who decide on whether to pursue a career in the nuclear apparatus. 
Next, country A maps the opinions and beliefs that guide individuals’ 
decisions, maps the sources through which these opinions and beliefs are 
shaped, and determines which will be possible for an outsider to shift. 
Opportunities for influence often present themselves when large and 
technology-engaged publics are involved or when free and open discussion is 
valued.19 
 
18 Sutton, M., Greene, A. and Amini, P., Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery, (Pearson 
Education, Inc.: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007). 
19 Lin, H. and Kerr, J., ‘On cyber-enabled information/influence warfare and manipulation’, 8 Aug. 
2017, to appear in Oxford Handbook of Cybersecurity (Oxford University Press: Oxford, forthcoming), 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015680>. 
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At this point, country A can profile its targets and identify the intermediary 
influencers it would need to engage.20 To profile a target, it might study the 
target’s behaviour (e.g. websites that she or he visits) and her or his identity 
and group membership, other beliefs and ideologies (from public statements), 
then draw up a psychological profile, and so on. Such information can be 
accessed today by several private companies (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) and the 
advertising firms that work with them. Based on the established profiles, 
country A can begin an influence campaign with a trial-and-error method of 
testing and refining targeted content (e.g. adverts, direct messages, news 
stories, etc), all the while measuring engagement and the magnitude of the 
effect that the messages have on the targets’ behaviour. This method 
significantly benefits from automation, and particularly from the ability to 
tailor messages that drive each individual towards the desired behaviour. The 
paths to that behaviour may be different for each person.21 For example, risk-
averse individuals or communities might be targeted with historical evidence 
of nuclear accidents, while small-government oriented communities might be 
advised of the costs of maintaining nuclear deterrence. Prospective recruits 
could be targeted with alternative job offers or careers. 
A nascent and powerful influencing technology is the ability to create life-
like forgeries of faces using generative adversarial networks (GANs). This 
enables the creation of videos in which individuals appear to be saying things 
that they have not said.22 These may be particularly powerful in reinforcing 
ideas to which a target community is ideologically predisposed. Forensic 
methods to identify content as fake are in their infancy and their efficacy is 
still in doubt.23  
 
The two threat scenarios outlined above—a search for vulnerabilities in an 
adversary’s nuclear digital information systems and influence campaigns to 
alter an adversary’s nuclear readiness and resolve—have existed since the 
Cold War era. However, both contain numerous steps that can be facilitated by 
autonomy and machine learning. These may lower the cost to the attacker, 
increase the speed, scale and efficacy of an attack, or reduce the risk to the 
attacker by obfuscating the links to the source and allowing for plausible 
deniability. This aspect of machine learning and autonomy in the nuclear 
weapons domain should be explored and red-teamed by parties who are in a 
 
20 Kosinski, M. et al., ‘Mining big data to extract patterns and predict real-life outcomes’, 
Psychological Methods, vol. 21, no. 4 (Dec. 2016), pp. 493–506, <https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000105>. 
21 Cai, H. et al., ‘Real-time bidding by reinforcement learning in display advertising’, Proceedings of 
the Tenth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM): New York, 2017), pp. 661–70, <https://doi.org/10.1145/3018661.3018702>. 
22 Suwajanakorn, S., Seitz, S. M. and Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I., ‘Synthesizing Obama: learning 
lip sync from audio’, ACM Transactions on Graphics, vol. 36, no. 4 (2017), article no. 95, 
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3072959.3073640>. On GANs see also chapter 1 in this volume. On the 
malicious use of deepfakes see also chapter 9 of this volume. 
23 Rössler, A., Cozzolino, D., Verdoliva, L., Riess, C., Thies, J., and Nießner, M., ‘Faceforensics: A 
large-scale video dataset for forgery detection in human faces.’ arXiv, 1803.09179, 24 Mar. 2018, < 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.09179.pdf>. 
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position to access the relevant classified information. Other general policy 
responses that may be appropriate are considered below. 
II. New threats require new policy responses 
Cyber threats undermine nuclear deterrence 
Nuclear deterrence works to counter threats of either nuclear or large-scale 
conventional attack through the transparency of its posture. It relies on an 
always/never alert status: always ready to be executed via legitimate authority, 
and never subject to compromise. Cyber operations, like other covert actions, 
rely on stealth: digital attacks exploit vulnerabilities unknown to the target 
states and often aim to remain secret; once made evident, attackers can lose 
their advantage as the target state can take counteraction.  
Increasingly, cyber vulnerabilities challenge nuclear deterrence because 
nuclear-armed states may not know that their capabilities have been impaired, 
and additionally they may have uncertainty about the status of their NC3 or 
NC4ISR systems. This can lead to either a false sense of confidence and 
recklessness in issuing threats with escalatory potential, or it may contribute to 
an overblown sense of vulnerability that encourages pre-emptive action. The 
erosion of credibility due to these uncertainties also undermines the 
overarching aim of deterring conflict. Furthermore, the bar to achieving 
offensive cyber capabilities is much lower than the bar required to establish 
credible nuclear deterrence, in terms of resources, talent and international 
regulation. In a world where cyber capabilities can be seen as offsetting 
nuclear capabilities, the number of potentially relevant actors grows 
significantly, and the adequacy of existing dyadic nuclear deterrence relations 
is thrown into question. Thus, the new reality of cyber vulnerabilities, and the 
tempting advantages to be gained through cyber operations, have created an 
unprecedented development in warfare. 
Recent reports by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) have found that even US military systems, 
which include networked components necessary for operating nuclear armed 
forces, are vulnerable to electronically mediated digital attacks.24 Even if, at 
least within the technologically advanced nuclear-armed states, NC3 systems 
are fully robust against digital intrusion, it will be more challenging to 
maintain this impervious systemic integrity with upgrades beyond the original 
analogue configurations to new digital platforms. Moreover, as itemized by 
the vast list of potential exploits provided by the GAO’s assessment, the 
entanglement of the nuclear and conventional planning and execution systems 
suggests that, in order to maintain a credible alert posture, the peripheral 
 
24 US Government Accountability Office (note 10), p. 30; and Stoutland, P. O. and Pitts-Kiefer, S., 
Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age, Report of the Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group (Nuclear 
Threat Initiative: Washington, DC, Sep. 2018), 
<https://www.nti.org/media/documents/Cyber_report_finalsmall.pdf>. 
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intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) architectures must be 
maintained at high levels of reliability.25 
Taken across the board, risks are posed by upgrades to NC3, entangled 
conventional and nuclear C4ISR systems, budget constraints, difficulties 
recruiting personnel with appropriate skills, inefficiencies inherent in large 
bureaucracies with competing jurisdictions, restrictions on sharing information 
across agencies, and the ongoing advancement of complexity consistent with 
rapid technological progress. There is an ongoing effort to revamp nuclear 
weapon systems to be consistent with state-of-the-art technologies, which now 
include autonomy and machine learning.  
The above combination of threats to nuclear deterrence, including the 
heightened cyberthreats from autonomy and machine learning, call for policy 
responses.  
Deterrence is likely to be insufficient as a policy response 
Within the framework of strategic stability, it may seem reasonable to tackle a 
novel threat, in this case that of the cyber compromise of NC4ISR systems, 
with deterrence. This is suggested, for example, in the 2018 US Nuclear 
Posture Review, which presents the threat of nuclear retaliation as a deterrent 
against cyberattack.26 However, the wisdom of this approach is questionable.  
Historically, deterrence has not proven effective against intelligence 
collection, special operations and similar covert actions, which cyber 
operations resemble. Furthermore, adding another trigger for nuclear response 
and escalation creates one more pathway to catastrophic outcomes through 
miscalculation or false alarms. For cyberthreats, there is significant 
uncertainty about the ability of a defender to detect an attack, identify it as an 
attack and attribute it correctly.27 Thus, to tackle the threats discussed above, 
only policy responses other than new forms of deterrence are considered. 
Proposed unilateral policy responses 
The first class of policy responses involve actions that a nuclear-armed state 
can take unilaterally to reduce the risks that it is exposed to from digital 
threats. By making itself more secure, such a state also helps maintain the 
deterrence relationships that it has in place. Overall, knowledge of potential 
exploits and steps to avoid them, detect them and address them must be in 
place as with any other standard security protocols.  
According to GAO reports, the US Department of Defense is only beginning 
to realize the extent of its cyber vulnerability challenges, and the GAO does 
 
25 Acton (note 13). 
26 US Department of Defense (DOD), Nuclear Posture Review (DOD: Washington, DC, Feb. 2018), 
<https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-
FINAL-REPORT.PDF>. 
27 Lindsay, J. R., ‘Restrained by design: the political economy of cybersecurity’, Digital Policy, 
Regulation and Governance, vol. 19, no. 6 (2017), pp. 493–514, <https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-05-
2017-0023>. 
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not offer any recommendations.28 Public information about the state of cyber 
vulnerabilities in other nuclear-armed states is currently lacking. However, it 
is possible to identify measures to address vulnerabilities from the domain of 
digital information, computation and communications technologies more 
generally. 
The unilateral policy proposals are surveyed in table 12.1. There are four 
key points. 
 
1. The integration of information and communications technology (ICT) 
systems into NC4ISR should be restricted. In particular, the introduction of 
autonomy and machine learning into these systems should be avoided. This 
should be reflected in procurement policies. 
2. The nuclear-armed states should be mindful of the potential threats and 
take proactive action to harden systems, enforce security protocols, regularly 
exercise and simulate attack. 
3. These states should develop attribution capacity, adopt procedures and 
doctrines that increase response time, and plan for rapid recovery from attacks.  
4. Good practice should be codified and widely dispersed to relevant 
personnel. Contingency protocols should be set up, tested and enforced. 
 
The recommendation against introducing autonomy and machine learning 
into NC4ISR systems should be highlighted, with emphasis heightened in 
relation to the closeness of a component to critical decision-making or to 
command and control. The proposals here endorse the NTI report 
recommendation against integrating these digital capacities into the technical 
infrastructure necessary to run nuclear security programmes.29 There will 
probably be efforts to introduce autonomy and machine learning into 
conventional ISR. However, due to entanglement, it is a sensible precaution to 
either severely restrict these methods or, at a minimum, to perform cost–
benefit analysis and comprehensive risk assessment. These precautions would 
allow informed decisions to be made that minimize the erosion of deterrence 
credibility and the resulting additional risk of inadvertent use of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
Table 12.1. Unilateral policy responses to reduce nuclear risks from cyber threats 
 
 Protect Detect Respond 
 (defence in (response to (response to  
Target peacetime) probing) attack)  
Decision procedurea Strict protocols Routine tests, simulations Quarantine 
 Secure communication Attribution capacity Attribute 
 Increase decision time  Evaluate  
 No autonomy; no ML  Neutralize 
   Counter 
 
28 US Government Accountability Office (note 10), preface. 
29 Stoutland and Pitts-Kiefer (note 24), p. 8. 
Shahar Avin  21/5/2019 14:05
Deleted: 360
EURO-ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES   11 
   Upgrade 
NC3 Redundancy Monitoring Quarantine 
 Expertise Testing Use backup 
 Secure sourcing Attribution capacity Protocol 
 System isolation  Buy time  
 Enhance survivability  Attribute 
 Cyber resilience 
 Formally verified 
 Cryptographic guarantees 
 Acquisition guidelines 
 No autonomy; no ML 
 No external contracts 
Nuclear ISR Redundant sensors As above Quarantine 
 Diverse phenomena  Decouple 
 Intelligence fusion  Use backup 
 No autonomy; no ML  Protocol 
 No external contracts  Attribute 
   Evaluate 
   Neutralize 
   Counter 
   Upgrade 
Conventional ISR Cost–benefit analysis Monitor (can use ML) As above 
 Comprehensive risk Long-term testing 
   assessment Attribution capacity 
 If entangled, treat as 
   nuclear 
Nuclear/military Competitive career Confidence building Counter 
  personnel   opportunities Routine checks Attribute 
 Vet Monitor (can use ML) Expose 
 Training, risk awareness Practice attacks Restrict 
 Protocols to protect at Attribution capacity 
   work and at home 
 Assist in maintaining  
   security 
Public opinion Education Monitoring (can use ML) As above 
 Establish trust Attribution capacity 
 Inform about risks Counterintelligence 
 Collaborate with media 
Infrastructure Upgrade cyber-defences Enhance industry Assess 
 Use cost–benefit analysis,   standards Bypass 
   risk assessment to  Monitoring (can use ML) Rebuild 
   prioritize high-value  Attribution capacity Upgrade 
   assets 
Supply chain Trusted sources Monitoring (can use ML) Assess 
 Security requirements Testing Report 
 Enhance industry  Attribution capacity Recall 
   best practice  Upgrade 
 Bespoke systems for NC3 
Research and Procurement guidelines Oversight, accountability Evaluate 
development, Budget for security Counterintelligence Counter 
testing, simulation, Expert, vetted and valued   Attribute 
12   ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
maintenance   staff 
 Redundancy  
ISR = intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; ML = machine learning; NC3 = nuclear 
command, control and communications. 
a These include e.g. crisis intelligence and assessment and nuclear planning systems. 
Proposed coordination-based policy responses 
Coordination around non-use of cyber capabilities against nuclear systems 
and personnel 
A responsible nuclear-armed state can realize that introducing autonomy and 
machine learning would probably increase its own vulnerability to mistakes 
and cyber operations, and therefore can unilaterally avoid introducing such 
methods into NC3 and NC4ISR systems. However it cannot unilaterally 
prevent another actor from using autonomy and machine learning as tools that 
enhance cyber operations and influence campaigns. The two scenarios 
presented in section I demonstrate how autonomy and machine learning could 
be potentially useful tools in operations against digital systems on the 
periphery and against individuals and communities of civilians (especially in 
densely digitally networked societies). It is evident that cybersecurity poses a 
grave challenge for a country’s own nuclear deterrent credibility. It is 
additionally clear that engaging in offensive operations against other states 
will necessarily erode the credibility of their nuclear deterrence. To maintain 
nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, states should exercise restraint by 
refraining from cyber operations against all other states’ nuclear weapons 
systems and personnel (i.e. broadly targeted information campaigns that could 
influence nuclear deterrence) and should strive to establish norms and 
institutions that prohibit such actions.  
Costly vigilance and recognition that computerized systems cannot be 100 
per cent secure is not unique to either nuclear or conventional military 
security. This a problem faced across the board in the densely networked 
digital systems that run finance and banking, communications, air and marine 
traffic, and healthcare organizations.30 However, the level of destructive 
capacity and existential risk is highest for NC3 and NC4ISR systems. Even 
though attacks in the nuclear domain may be much costlier for the attacker to 
execute than in other domains, they are not beyond the resources available to 
states, potentially including non-nuclear-armed states with advanced 
technology.31 Assuming that the chief aim of nuclear-armed states in 
maintaining nuclear deterrence is stability and security—which is contradicted 
by nuclear war with an inherent perceptible risk of escalation—then no matter 
 
30 US Government Accountability Office (note 10), p. 30; and Lindsay, J. R., ‘Tipping the scales: the 
attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack’, Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 
11, no. 1 (Sep. 2015), pp. 53–67, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyv003>. 
31 Slayton, R., ‘What is the cyber offense–defense balance? Conceptions, causes, and assessment’, 
International Security, vol. 41, no. 3 (winter 2016/2017), pp. 72–109. 
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how tempting it may seem to disrupt a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear 
command-and-control and related systems, such action risks everyone’s 
security. 
Given the common interest in maintaining stability and avoiding nuclear 
war, all states and global populations stand to gain from constraints against 
initiating offensive campaigns against military information systems and 
personnel. Even within civilian societies that are networked and globalized 
using digital platforms that recognize no national borders, there is a collective 
benefit to maintaining the cyber commons that rely on cooperation and the 
development of norms against cyberattacks. This holds even more powerfully 
when considering the potential weaponization of autonomy and machine 
learning as a force multiplier for cyber operations and influence campaigns, 
and the need for norms to prevent such weaponization. Nuclear weapons states 
share a common interest in developing three basic norms: (a) to achieve best 
practices in maintaining the security of their own NC3 and NC4ISR systems, 
(b) to denounce and refrain from conducting offensive cyber actions, and (c) 
to limit the weaponization of autonomy and machine learning, especially in 
the cyber and information warfare domains. These limitations should extend 
beyond the immediate nuclear or military domain, as techniques and methods 
can be easily transferred from one domain to another. 
It seems obvious to develop these cooperative norms among allies, at least 
those around non-use, because alliance and collaboration is contradicted by 
either detecting others’ cyber vulnerabilities without sharing that information 
or with the intent to possibly exploit those weaknesses.  
However, overall the added risk posed by undermining nuclear deterrence 
threatens the security of all. A plausible case thus exists to coordinate efforts 
to prevent development of offensive cyber capabilities (especially highly 
effective tools that rely on autonomy and machine learning), not only with 
allied states but also potentially with those whose interests are only partially 
aligned at best. For example, although China, Russia and the USA do not have 
the same geopolitical or economic interests, none would benefit from a 
nuclear conflict.  
Coordination around enhanced security and best practices in NC4ISR 
In addition to coordination around minimizing offensive use of cyber 
capabilities (including ones based on autonomy and machine learning), it 
might also be possible and necessary for nuclear-armed states to coordinate on 
increased cyber-defences, through the sharing of information about best 
practices and related defensive technologies. Even despite the impossibility of 
achieving 100 per cent security in the contemporary world of advanced 
computation, significant improvements can be made to increase the cost for a 
putative attacker, at times (e.g. through cryptographic means) to levels that 
render certain attacks infeasible in practice.  
Given that it is, for example, the USA that could lose the most if some 
aspect of Russia’s nuclear command-and-control system malfunctioned, either 
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due to an internal bug or a malicious attack, then the USA stands to benefit if 
Russia’s NC3 and NC4ISR systems are technically and procedurally up to the 
international standard of best cybersecurity practices. This is especially true in 
the face of heighted threats from a wider range of actors, assisted by the easy 
and rapid proliferation of weaponizable autonomy and machine learning 
techniques in the cyber domain.32  
The shared interest in maintaining credible nuclear deterrent status therefore 
encourages norms to achieve best cybersecurity practices, which include 
avoiding integration of autonomy and machine learning in NC3 and NC4ISR 
systems and sharing provably secure digital platforms. 
III. Conclusions 
The introduction of autonomy and machine learning currently cannot be 
achieved without introducing new vulnerabilities that undermine the 
always/never alert status and the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, 
their integration into NC3 and NC4ISR systems should be avoided, for 
example through strict guidelines embedded in procurement policies. 
In addition to unilateral action that can be taken by nuclear-armed states to 
reduce vulnerabilities and prepare for attacks, a second method for not 
increasing existential risk already posed by intentional, inadvertent or 
accidental nuclear war is to develop and institutionalize international norms 
and coordination mechanisms. There are three domains of particular 
relevance: (a) establishing an international norm prohibiting targeting of 
NC4ISR systems and nuclear weapon personnel, (b) promoting a norm against 
the weaponization of autonomy and machine learning, especially in the 
domains of cyberattacks and influence campaigns, and (c) sharing 
cybersecurity best practices and cyber-defences among nuclear-armed states, 
including the best practice of not integrating autonomy and machine learning 




32 Brundage et al. (note 14). 
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